Abstract. We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our approach not only allows us to tackle the mean field of states and the mean field of control in the same time, but also extend the strategy set of players from Markov strategies to closed-loop strategies. We show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the mean field game, as well as how the equilibrium of mean field game consists of an approximative Nash equilibrium for the game with finite number of players under different assumptions of structure and regularity on the cost functions and transition rate between states.
Introduction
Mean field game in which players' states belong to a finite space is first studied in [14] . The dynamics of each player's states is depicted by a continuous-time Markov chain, whose transition rate matrix is a function of the player's control and probability distribution of all players' states. By assuming that each player adopts a Markovian strategy, the Nash equilibrium can be characterized by a HJB equation corresponding to the optimal control of continuous-time Markov chain on the one hand, and a Kolmogorov equation on how probability distribution of player's states evolves on the other hand. Due to the finite nature of the state space, both equations turn out to be ordinary differential equations and existence of the solution to this forward-backward system can be obtained by a fixed point argument. Continuous-time finite state mean field games were applied to model socio-economic phenomena such as paradigm shift in a scientific community and consumer choice in [15] . In [19] , the strategic aspect of cyber attack and defense is analyzed through a finite state mean field game model, in which the author introduces a major player -the hacker -whose action influences each minor player -the computer user -in terms of their payoff and dynamics. Theoretical aspects of finite state mean field games with major and minor players are investigated in [4] where existence of Nash equilibria and results on approximate Nash equilibrium for finite player game in small duration are obtained, along with the master equation characterizing the Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, we develop a probabilistic framework for continuous-time finite state mean field game. Our starting point is a semimartingale representation of continuous-time Markov chain introduced in [10] : Let (X t ) 0≤t≤T be a continuous-time Markov chain with m states which are identified with the m standard basis vectors in R m , then we can write:
where Q(t) is the transition rate matrix (also known as the Q-matrix) with Q * (t) being its transpose and M is a martingale. We immediately notice the analogy with diffusion processes and apply Girsanov Theorem to construct equivalent probability measures under which the process X admits a different transition rate process. This opens a pathway to formulating the optimal control problem of continous-time Markov chain in a so-called weak fashion. Indeed, in the context of optimal control of diffusion processes, the weak formulation links the control of the drift to the control of the probability measure (as opposed to the control of the path) and identifies the value function of the control problem as the solution to a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) . By the comparison principle of the BSDE, the optimality of the control problem can be obtained by optimizing the driver of the BSDE which coincides with the Hamiltonian function. It turns out that such procedure can be transplanted to the case of optimal control of continuous-time Markov chain, thanks to the theory of BSDE driven by Markov chain developed in [6] and [7] .
Once the optimal control problem can be characterized by a BSDE, our next step is to develop a probabilistic approach to the mean field game. Probabilistic approach to mean field game is first proposed in [2] , where player's optimization problem is treated in the strong formulation. By applying Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, the optimality of player's control problem is characterized by a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) . Later in [3] , the authors consider the weak formulation of control problem and use the argument of change of measure which we briefly described above to obtain the BSDE characterizing the optimality. In both cases, the existence of Nash equilibria of the mean field game boils down to the well-posedness of a BSDE (or FBSDE) in which the probability distribution of the solution enters into the driver and the terminal condition of the equation. These are the so-called McKean-Vlasov type of BSDE (or FBSDE) for which the existence of the solution can be obtained by a fixed-point argumentà la Schauder.
By developing the weak formulation, our contributions to finite state mean field game are three-fold. On the one hand, the flexibility of the probabilistic approach allows us to incorporate not only the mean field of state, but also the mean field of control into the dynamics and cost functionals of individual players. Mean field of control is known to be notoriously intractable via PDE method, due to the difficulties in deriving the equation obeyed by the flow of probability measure of the optimal control. Under the probabilistic framework however, the mean field of state and the mean field of control can be dealt with in similar manners, although the treatment of mean field of control is more involved in terms of the topological argument. On the other hand, using the weak formulation we are able to show Nash equilibria exist among all closed-loop strategies, including the strategies depending on the past history of player's states, whereas the PDE approach can only accommodate Markovian strategies.
Lastly, the weak formulation we develop for the finite state mean field game will serve as a launching pad to tackle the finite state mean field agent-principal problem. Such model is a form of Stackelberg game in which the principal fixes a contract first and a large population of agents reaches Nash equilibrium according to the contract proposed by the principal. By fixing a contract we actually mean that the principal chooses a control which enters into each agent's dynamics and cost functions. One meaningful direction in probing mean field agent-principal problems is to understand how the principal can choose the optimal contract so that its own cost function depending on agent's distribution is minimized. To the best of our knowledge, this type of problem is first investigated in [9] where the agent's dynamics is a diffusion. The main idea is to formulate the optimal contract problem as a Mckean-Vlasov optimal control problem, in which the state process to be controlled is the Mckean-Vlasov BSDE characterizing the Nash equilibrium in the weak formulation of the mean field game. With the help of the weak formulation we develop in this paper, we believe that the same technique can be applied to the case of finite state mean field agent-principal problem, which could lead to potential applications in epidemics and cyber security.
We would also like to mention a few literatures related to our paper. In [5] the authors proposed a probabilistic framework for finite state mean field game where the player's dynamics of states is represented by stochastic differential equations driven by Poisson random measures. By using Ky Fan's fixed point theorem, the authors obtained existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in relaxed open-loop as well as relaxed feedback controls. Then under stronger assumption that guarantees uniqueness of optimal non-relaxed feedback control, the authors deduced existence of Nash equilibria in non-relaxed feedback form. In [8] , continuous-time mean field games with finite state space and finite action space were studied. The authors proved existence of Nash equilibrium among relaxed feedback controls. In [1] the authors investigated mean field games where each player's state follows a jumpdiffusion process and the player controls the sizes of the jumps. The formulation is based on weak formulation of stochastic controls and martingale problems. Existence of Nash equilibrium among relaxed controls and Markovian controls is established.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the weak formulation of finite state mean field game, which is based on a semimartingale representation of continuous-time Markov chain and an argument of change of measure. We state the assumptions used throughout the paper and give the precise definition of the Nash equilibrium in the weak formulation. In Section 3, we analyze player's optimal control problem when facing a fixed mean field of state and control, by characterizing the value function and the optimal control using a BSDE driven by Markov chain. Section 4 is devoted to the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Finally in Section 5, we formulate the game with finite number of players and show the Nash equilibrium of the mean field game is an approximate Nash equilibrium of the game with finite number of players.
2. The Weak Formulation for Finite State Mean Field Games 2.1. Notations. If M is a square real matrix, we denote by by M * its transpose and M + its Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse. For a column vector X, we denote by diag(X) the square diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are given by the entries of X. If γ is a random variable on a probability space (Ω, F , P), we denote its law or its distribution, namely the push-forward of P by γby P #γ := P • γ −1 .
For two square integrable martingales L, M , we denote by [L, M ] the quadratic covariation process of L and M . For two semimartingales L and M , we denote by L, M the predictable quadratic covariation process of L and M . For a semimartingale L such that L 0 = 0, we denote by E(L) the process of Doléans-Dade exponential of L. See Chapter II.6 in [21] for the definitions of these standard concepts.
2.2. Controlled probability measure. For the control of continuous-time finite state Markov chains we adopt the formalism first introduced in [10] , and later developed in [6] and [7] . If X = (X t ) 0≤t≤T is a continuous-time Markov chain with m states, we identify these states with the basis vectors e i in R m and we denote by E the resulting state space E = {e 1 , . . . , e m }. We assume that the sample paths t → X t are càdlàg, i.e. right continuous with left limits, and continuous at T . In other words, we force X T − = X T .
We first construct a canonical probability space for X. Let Ω be the space of càdlàg functions from [0, T ] to E which are continuous at T , and let X be the canonical process on Ω, that is X t (ω) := ω t . We denote by F := (F t ) t∈[0,T ] with F t := σ{X s , s ≤ t} the natural filtration generated by X, and we set F := F T . Throughout the rest of the paper, we fix a probability measure p
• on the set E. It will be used as the initial distribution of the process X. On the filtered space (Ω, F, F ), we consider the probability measure P under which X is a continuous-time Markov chain with initial distribution p
• and transition rates between any two different states equal to 1. This means that for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i = j and ∆t > 0, we have P[X t+∆t = e j |F t ] = P[X t+∆t = e j |X t ] and P[X t+∆t = e j |X t = e i ] = ∆t + o(∆t). By Appendix B in [10] , the process X has the representation:
(1)
where Q 0 is the square matrix with diagonal elements all equal to −(m − 1) and off-diagonal elements all equal to 1, and bcM = (M t ) t≥0 is a R m -valued P-martingale. The multiplication · is understood as matrix multiplication. Indeed, Q 0 is the transition rate matrix of X under the probability measure P.
Remark 2.1. The representation originally proposed in [10] is:
However since X t is only discontinuous on a countable set, we can replace X t by X t− in the integral. The reason for this slight change of representation is to make the integrand a predictable process, which will be suitable for the change of measure argument in what follows.
We shall refer to the probability measure P as the reference measure on the sample space. The first step of the weak formulation of mean field game consists in depicting how each player's control as well as the mean field determine the probability measure of the sample path. We denote by S the m-dimensional simplex:
which we identify with the space of probability distributions on E. Let A be a compact subset of R l from which the players can choose their controls. Denote by P(A) the space of probability measures on A. We introduce a function q:
and we denote by Q(t, α, p, ν) the matrix [q(t, i, j, α, p, ν)] 1≤i,j≤m . Throughout the rest of the paper, we make the following assumption on q:
where W 1 denotes the 1-Wasserstein distance between probability measures on A.
Recall that a matrix
Remark 2.3. Assumption 2.2 is analog to the non-degeneracy condition in the diffusion-based mean field game models. It guarantees that the probability measure Q (α,p,ν) defined in (7) below, is equivalent to the reference measure P. In some applications of continuous-time Markov chain models, it happens that jumps from some states to others are forbidden, in which case the transition rate function q would satisfy q(t, i, j, α, p, ν) ≡ 0 for some couples (i, j). For example, this is the case in the botnet defense model proposed by [19] , as well as in the extended version of the model which includes an attacker studied in [4] . When that happens, we need to use a different reference probability measure P: we set the transition rate to 1 for all the jumps, except for those that are forbidden, for which we set the transition rate to 0. Fortunately, this is the only modification we need to make in order to accommodate this kind of special case. The arguments presented in the following can be trivially extended to be compatible with this modified reference probability.
We state without proof a useful property of the martingale M. The proof of this result can be found in [6] : Lemma 2.4. The predictable quadratic variation of the martingale M under P is given by the formula:
where ψ t is given by:
If we define for each i the matrix ψ i by:
Since each ψ i is a semi-definite positive matrix, so is ψ t . We define the corresponding (stochastic) seminorm · Xt− on R m by:
The semi-norm · Xt− can be rewritten in a more explicit way. For i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let us define the seminorm
Then it is easy to see that
Since ψ t is symmetric, we have (ψ
t is the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of the matrix ψ t . On the other hand, it is straightforward to verify that for all t ∈ [0, T ] and w ∈ Ω, the range of the matrix ψ t (i.e. the linear space spanned by the columns of ψ t ) is the space {q ∈ R m ;
This holds in particular for any row vector from any Q-matrix, or any vector of the form (e j − e i ).
In order for the paper to be as self-contained as possible, we also recall the following version of Girsanov Theorem on change of probability measure. See Theorem III.41 in [21] or Lemma 4.3 in [23] .
Theorem 2.5. Let T > 0 and L = (L t ) t≥0 be a martingale defined on [0, T ] with ∆L t ≥ −1. Assume that the Doléans-Dade exponential E(L) of L is a uniformly integrable martingale and let Q be the probability measure having Radon-Nikodym derivative E(L) T with respect to P. If the quadratic covariation process [M, L] is integrable under P, then M − M, L is a martingale under Q, where the predictable quadratic covariation M, L is computed under the measure P.
We now describe how the control of a player and the mean field affect the probability law of X. Let us define the player's strategy set A to be the collection of F-predictable
Given a flow of probability measures p = (p t ) t∈[0,T ] on E, and a flow of probability measures ν = (ν t ) t∈[0,T ] on A, we define the scalar martingale L (α,p,ν) under P by:
Clearly, the jumps of this are given by:
m e i when X t− = e i = e j . Therefore when X t− = e i = e j = X t , we have:
where the last equality is due to the fact that 
This is straightforward since we have:
and the integrand is bounded by some constant by Assumption 2.2.
We now apply Girsanov's Theorem. It is straightforward to obtain that:
In the last equality, we use the fact that (Q * (s, α s , p s , ν s ) − Q 0 )X s is the difference between two row vectors coming from Q-matrices, therefore is invariant by ψ s · ψ + s . Let us define the probability measure Q (α,p,ν) by:
By Theorem 2.5, we know that the process M (α,p,ν) , defined as:
is a Q (α,p,ν) -martingale. Therefore the canonical decomposition (1) of X under P can be rewritten as:
This means that under the measure Q (α,p,ν) , the stochastic intensity rate of X is given by Q(t, α t , p t , ν t ). In addition, since Q (α,p,ν) and P coincides on F 0 , the law of X 0 under Q (α,p,ν) is the same as under the reference measure P, which is p
• . In particular, when α is a Markov control, i.e. of the form α t = φ(t, X t− ) for some measurable function φ, X becomes a continuous-time Markov chain with intensity rate q(t, i, j, φ(t, i), p t , ν t ) under the measure Q (α,p,ν) .
Remark 2.6. In the optimal control literature, admissible controls are often classified into the categories of openloop controls and closed-loop controls. Open-loop controls are often referred to controls adapted to the underlying filtration, which is often generated by the noise process. Closed-loop controls, on the other hand, are controls that are adapted to the filtration generated by the history of the state process. In our set up, however, we see that the underlying filtration is indeed the one generated by the past path of the state process. Therefore this difference vanishes.
2.3. Weak formulation of mean field games. Let f : [0, T ] × E × A × S × P(A) → R and g : E × S → R be respectively the running and terminal cost functions. In the rest of the paper, we make the following assumptions on the regularity of the cost functions.
Assumption 2.7. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all (t, i, j) ∈ [0, T ] × E 2 , α, α ′ ∈ A, p, p ′ ∈ S and ν, ν ′ ∈ P(A), we have:
When a player chooses a strategy α ∈ A and the mean field is (p, ν), its cost is:
Each player aims at minimizing its cost, that is, it solves the optimization problem:
The key idea of the theory of mean field games lies in the limit scenario of having infinitely many players in the game, where a single player's strategy α does not alter the mean field (p, ν). Therefore when each player solves its own optimization problem, it considers (p, ν) as given. A Nash equilibrium is then achieved when the law of X t under the player controlled probability law, along with the distribution of its control under the same probability law, coincide with (p, ν). This justifies the following definition of a Nash equilibrium for the weak formulation of finite state mean field games. 
(ii) (α * , p * , ν * ) satisfies the consistency conditions whereby for each time t ∈ [0, T ] it holds:
Individual Player's Optimization Problem
Before introducing and solving the individual player optimization problem, we provide the necessary background on stochastic equations based on continuous time Markov chains.
3.1. BSDE driven by continuous-time Markov chain. We first recall some of the results on BSDEs driven by continuous-time Markov chains obtained in [6] and [7] . Recall that M is the P-martingale in the canonical decomposition of the Markov chain X in (1). We consider the following BSDE with unknown (Y, Z), where Y is an adapted and càdlàg process in R, and Z is an adapted and left-continuous process in R m :
(17)
Here ξ is a F T -measurable P-square integrable random variable and F is the driver function, assumed to be such that the process t → F (w, t, y, z) is predictable for all y, z. 
Xt− dt] = 0. We also have the following stability property, which can be proved by mimicking the argument used in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [16] .
be the solution to the BSDE (17) with driver F n and terminal condition ξ n . Assume that for each n, F n satisfies the Lipschitz continuity assumption in Lemma 3.1 with the same constant. In addition, assume that the following conditions hold:
≤ C for all t ≤ T and n ≥ 0. Then we have:
Finally we state a crucial comparison result for linear BSDEs. See Theorem 3.16 in [7] .
Lemma 3.3. Let γ be a bounded predictable process in R m , β a bounded predictable process in R, φ a non-negative predictable process in R such that E[ T 0 φ t 2 dt] < +∞, and ξ a non-negative square-integrable F T -measurable random variable in R, and let us assume that (Y, Z) solves the linear BSDE:
If for all t ∈ (0, T ] and j such that e *
is the Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix ψ t defined in equation (3), then Y is nonnegative.
Later in the treatment of games with finitely many players, we will need to consider BSDEs driven by multiple independent continuous-time Markov chains. It turns out that all the results above regarding BSDEs driven by one single continuous-time Markov chain can be easily extended to this more general setting. For the sake of completeness, we state and prove these results in the appendix.
3.2.
Hamiltonian. We define the Hamiltonian for the optimization problem of the individual player as the function
Since the process X takes value in the set {e 1 , . . . , e m }, it is more convenient to consider m Hamiltonian functions
Clearly we have:
We denote byĤ i the corresponding minimized Hamiltonian:
and to show the existence of Nash equilibria, we make the following assumption on the minimizer of the Hamiltonian.
. . , m}, z ∈ R m , p ∈ S and ν ∈ P(A), the mapping α → H i (t, z, α, p, ν) admits a unique minimizer which does not depend on the mean field of control ν. We denote the minimizer byâ i (t, z, p).
(ii)â i is measurable on [0, T ]×R m ×S and there exist constants C 1 > 0 and
Remark 3.5. For the sake of convenience, we choose to make the assumption directly on the uniqueness and the regularity of the minimizer of the Hamiltonian. One possible way to make sure Assumption 3.4 holds is to impose linearity on the transition rate function q, and strong convexity of the running cost function f . For example, the following set of conditions will guarantee that Assumption 3.4 holds:
A is a convex and compact subset of R l . (ii) The transition rate function q takes the form q(t, i, j, α, p, ν) = q 0 (t, i, j, p, ν) + q 1 (t, i, j, p) · α, where q 0 :
is once continuously differentiable and there exists a constant C > 0 such that:
we have:
We define the functionsĤ andâ by:
From item (i) of Assumption 3.4 and the definition of the reduced Hamiltonian H i , it is clear thatâ(t, x, z, p) is the unique minimizer of the mapping α → H(t, x, z, α, p, ν), and the minimum equalsĤ(t, x, z, p, ν). In addition, from Assumptions 2.2, 2.7, 3.4, and the definition of the stochastic semi-norm · Xt− , it is easy to deduce the regularity of the mappingsĤ andâ.
Lemma 3.7. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × (0, T ], p, p ′ ∈ S, ν, ν ′ ∈ P(A) and z, z ′ ∈ R m , we have:
Proof. Inequality (27) is an easy consequence of Assumption 3.4 and the definition of the stochastic seminorm · Xt− . We now deal with the regularity ofĤ. By Berge's maximum theorem, the continuity of H i and the compactness of A imply the continuity ofĤ i . Let z, z ′ ∈ R m , p, p ′ ∈ S and ν, ν ′ ∈ P(A). For any α ∈ A, we have:
where we used the Lipschitz property of f and q, and the boundedness of A and q. Since the above is true for all α ∈ A, taking supremum of the left-hand side, we obtain:
Exchanging the roles of z and z ′ , we obtain:
and (26) follows immediately from the definition of the seminorm · Xt− .
3.3.
Player's optimization problem. In this subsection, we show that the optimization problem of the player facing a given mean field of state and control can be characterized by a BSDE driven by the continuous-time Markov chain X. Let us fix measurable flows p : [0, T ] → S and ν : [0, T ] → P(A), an admissible strategy α ∈ A, and let us consider the BSDE:
Proof. From the boundedness of the transition rate function q guaranteed by Assumption 2.2, it is easy to check that the driver function H of the BSDE (28) is Lipschitz in z with respect to the semi-norm · Xt− . Therefore by Lemma 3.1, it admits a unique solution (Y, Z). Moreover, we have:
Since M (α,p,ν) is a martingale under the measure Q (α,p,ν) , we take expectation under Q (α,p,ν) and obtain
Now we consider the following BSDE:
and we show that it characterizes the optimality of the control problem (13).
Proposition 3.9. For any measurable function p from [0, T ] to S and any measurable function ν from [0, T ] to P(A), the BSDE (29) admits a unique solution (Y, Z). The value function of the optimal control problem (13) is given by V (p, ν) = E P [Y 0 ] and the processα (p,ν) defined by:
is an optimal control. In addition, if α ′ ∈ A is an optimal control, we have α
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution to (29) is easily verified by using the Lipschitz property ofĤ provided by Lemma 3.7. Let (Y, Z) be this unique solution and define the processα byα t :=â(t, X t− , Z t , p t ).
Recall the definition ofâ in equation (25). We have:
Sinceâ i is measurable for each i ∈ E, we see thatâ is a measurable mapping from [0, T ] × R m × R m × S to A. Since both the processes t → X t− and Z are predictable, we conclude thatα is a predictable process and therefore an admissible control. Now let us fix an arbitrary admissible control α ∈ A, and denote by (Y α , Z α ) the solution of the corresponding BSDE (28), and by (Y, Z) the unique solution of:
Setting ∆Y := Y α − Y and ∆Z := Z α − Z and computing the difference of the two BSDEs, we notice that ∆Y and ∆Z solve the following BSDE:
We can further decompose the driver of the above BSDE as:
Define the processes ψ and γ by
Therefore (∆Y, ∆Z) appears as the solution to a linear BSDE of the form (18) with ψ and γ defined previously and β = 0. Clearly ψ and γ are both predictable. Sinceα t minimizes the Hamiltonian, ψ is nonnegative. The boundedness of γ follows from the boundedness of the transition rate function q. It remains to check that
When X t− = e j , the above inequality holds clearly. So we assume that X t− = e i = e j . We have ψ
Therefore when X t− = e i = e j , we have:
, where the last equality is due to the fact that k (q(t, i, k, α t , p t , ν t ) − q 0 i,k ) = 0. Therefore we have:
By Lemma 3.3, we conclude that ∆Y is nonnegative and in particular Y α 0 ≥ Y 0 . Since α is an arbitrary admissible control, in light of Lemma 3.8, this means that
. Finally, we notice that Y 0 is the expected total cost when the control isα. We conclude thatα is an optimal control and
. Now we show thatα is the unique optimal control. Let α ′ be another optimal control. We consider the solution (Y ′ , Z ′ ) to the following BSDE:
. Now taking the difference of the BSDE (31) and (32), we obtain:
Taking Q (α ′ ,p,ν) -expectations and using the fact that Q (α ′ ,p,ν) coincides with P in F 0 , we get:
where the last inequality is due to the fact thatα t minimizes the Hamiltonian. In fact, we haveα t = α
If we assume otherwise, the last inequality would be strict, since the minimizer of the Hamiltonian is unique by Assumption 3.4. Since P is equivalent to
Existence of Nash Equilibria
We state the main result of this section: Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions 2.2, 2.7 and 3.4, there exists a Nash equilibrium (α * , p * , ν * ) for the weak formulation of the finite state mean field game in the sense of Definition 2.8.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.1. As in the case of diffusion-based mean field games, we shall rely on a fixed point argument to show existence of Nash equilibria. We start from a measurable function p : [0, T ] → S and a measurable function ν : [0, T ] → P(A) where we recall that S is the m-dimensional simplex which we identify with the space of probability measures on E, while P(A) is the space of probability measures on A. We then solve the BSDE (29), and obtain the solution (Y (p,ν) , Z (p,ν) ) as well as the optimal controlα (p,ν) given by (30). Finally, we compute the probability measureQ
as defined in (7), and consider the push-forward measures ofQ
). Clearly, we identified a Nash equilibrium if we find a fixed point for the mapping (p, ν) →Q
In practice however, the implementation of the fixed-point argument mentioned above is prone to several difficulties. The foremost challenge lies in the lack of results allowing us to identify compact subsets of the spaces of measurable functions from [0, T ] to S or P(A). This makes it difficult to apply Schauder's theorem or similar versions of fixed point theorems. For this reason, we shall resort to different descriptions of the mean field for the state and the control. For the mean field of the state, since we have assumed from the very beginning that X is a càdlàg process, we will directly deal with its probability law on the space D of all càdlàg functions from [0, T ] to E = {e 1 , . . . , e m } endowed with the Skorokhod topology. The space of probability measures on D and its topological properties have been studied thoroughly (see [18] for a detailed account), and a simple criterion for compactness is available.
Unfortunately, resolving the corresponding issue for the control is more involved. Here, we adopt the technique based on the stable topology used in [3] . Indeed, a measurable mapping from [0, T ] to P(A) can be viewed as a random variable defined on the space
, L is the uniform probability measure on [0, T ] and P(A) is endowed with the Wasserstein-1 distance. To obtain compactness, the idea is to use randomization. We consider the space of probability measures on [0, T ] × P(A), denoted by P([0, T ] × P(A)). Then for each measurable mapping ν from [0, T ] to P(A), we consider the measure η on [0, T ] × P(A) given by η(dt, dm) := L(dt) × δ νt (dm) where δ is the Dirac measure. We may endow the space P([0, T ] × P(A)) with the so-called stable topology introduced in [17] , for which convenient results on compactness are readily available.
In the following, we detail the steps that lead to the existence of Nash equilibria. We start by specifying the topology we use for the space of mean fields on the state as well as the control. We then properly define the mapping compatible with the definition of Nash equilibrium, we show its continuity, and construct a stable compact. Once these ingredients are in place, we apply Schauder's fixed point theorem to conclude. Recall that the reference measure P is an element of P. Let P 0 be the subset of P defined by:
where C 0 is a constant which we will specify later (see the proof of Proposition 4.10). We have the following result:
Proposition 4.2. P 0 is convex and relatively compact in P.
Proof. The convexity of P 0 is trivial. Let us show that P 0 is relatively compact. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. For K ∈ N and δ > 0, we define D δ,K as the collection of paths in D which meet the following criteria: (a) the path has no more than K discontinuities, (b) the first jump time, if any, happens on or after δ, (c) the last jump happens on or before T − δ, and (d) the amounts of time between jumps are greater or equal than δ. We now show that D δ,K is compact in D. Since D is Polish space it is enough to show the sequential compactness. Let us fix a sequence x n in D δ,K . For each x n , we use the following notation: k n is the number of its jumps, In the above representation, the first coordinate of y n is the number of jumps. Coordinate 2 to K + 1 are the times elapsed between jumps defined above, and if there are fewer than K jumps, we complete the vector by 0. Coordinates K + 2 to 2(K + 1) are the values taken by the path x and completed with 0. Clearly there is a bijection from x n to y n by this representation. By the definition of the set D δ,K , we have ∆t i n ∈ [δ, T ] for i ≤ k n and kn i=1 ∆t i n ≤ T − δ, whereas the rest of the coordinates of y n belongs to a finite set. This implies that y n lives in a compact and therefore we can extract a converging subsequence which we still denote by y n . Again, since k n and the last K + 1 components can only take finitely many values by their definition, therefore there exists N 0 such that for n ≥ N 0 , we have k n = k and x i n = x i for all i ≤ k. In addition we have ∆t i n converges to ∆t i for all i ≤ k, where ∆t i ≥ δ for all i ≤ k and
We consider the path represented by the vector y:
Clearly x belongs to the set D δ.K and it is straightforward to verify that x n converge to x in J1 metric, where x n is the path represented by the vector y n . This implies that D δ.K is compact.
Step 2. Now we show that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 and K ∈ N such that P(D δ.K ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Recall that P is the reference measure and under P the canonical process X is a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rate matrix Q 0 . Therefore the time of first jump, as well as the time between consecutive jumps thereafter, which we denote by ∆t 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . are i.i.d. exponential random variables of parameter (m − 1) under the measure P. We have:
For each k = 1, . . . , K, we have:
It follows that:
We can first pick K greater enough such that (exp(−(m − 1)T )
is greater than (1 − ǫ/2) and then pick δ small enough to make the rest of the terms greater than −ǫ/2, which eventually makes P(D δ,K ) greater than (1 − ǫ).
Step 3. Finally we show that P 0 is tight. For any ǫ > 0, by Step 2, we can pick δ > 0 and K ∈ N such that
1/2 ≤ C 0 and by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we obtain:
This implies the tightness of P 0 . Finally by Prokhorov's Theorem we conclude that P 0 is relatively compact.
We now need to link the convergence of measures on path space to the convergence in S, i.e. measures on state space. We define the function π by:
and prove the following result:
at most countable such that for all t ∈ D(µ):
Proof. Define D(µ) := {0 ≤ t ≤ T ; µ(X t − X t− = 0) > 0}. By Lemma 3.12 in [18] , the set D(µ) is at most countable. In addition, we have T ∈ D(µ) since all the paths in D is left-continuous on T . In light of Proposition 3.14 in [18] , we have µ n #Xt converges to µ #Xt weakly for all t ∈ D(µ). To conclude, we use the fact that µ n #Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ] and n are counting measure on the discrete set E.
We now turn to the mean field of control. Let (P(A), W 1 ) be the space of probability measures on the compact set A ⊂ R l endowed with the weak topology and metricized by the Wasserstein-1 distance. (P(A), W 1 ) is a Polish space. Since A is compact, it is easy to show that P(A) is tight and therefore by Prokhorov's theorem (P(A), W 1 ) is in fact compact. We endow P(A) with its Borel σ−algebra denoted by B (P(A) ). We endow We collect a few useful results on the space R endowed with the stable topology. We now show that R is compact. Notice that for an element η in R, its first marginal is a probability measure on [0, T ] and its second marginal is a probability measure on P(A). It is trivial to see that both the spaces of probability measures on [0, T ] and on P(A) are tight and therefore relatively compact by Prokhorov's theorem. We then apply Theorem 2.8 in [17] and obtain the compactness of R.
Having showed that R is compact and metrizable, we see that R is separable. Compactness also leads to completeness. Therefore R is Polish space. Finally, we notice that R is also sequential compact since R is metrizable.
The following result provides a more convenient way to characterize the convergence in the stable topology. Proof. Let H 0 be the collection of mappings f of the form f (t, ν) = 1 B (t) · g(ν) where B is a Borel subset of [0, T ] and g : P(A) → R is a bounded and uniformly continuous function. Then clearly we have H ⊂ H 0 . By Proposition 2.4 in [17] , the stable topology is the coarsest topology under which the mappings η → [0,T ]×P(A) f (t, ν)η(dt, dν) are continuous for all f ∈ H 0 . Therefore, we only need to show that if η n is a sequence of elements in R such that
Now let us fix f ∈ H 0 with f (t, ν) = 1 B (t) · g(ν), Note that P(A) is a compact metric space and g is a bounded, uniformly continuous and real-valued function. A famous result from [13] (see also [20] ) shows that g can be approximated uniformly by bounded Lipschitz continuous function. That is, for all ǫ > 0, we can find g ǫ ∈ H such that sup ν∈P(A) |g ǫ (ν) − g(ν)| ≤ ǫ/3. By our assumption we have 1
Combining these facts we have, for n ≥ N 0 :
Now we consider the following subset of R:
We have the following result:
Lemma 4.7. R 0 is a convex and compact subset of R.
Proof. We apply Theorem 2.8 in [17] . In particular, we verify without difficulty that {η [0,T ] ; η ∈ R 0 } = {L} is compact and {η P(A) ; η ∈ R 0 } is a subset of P(P(A)), which is relatively compact as well.
For any η ∈ R 0 , since its first marginal is L, by disintegration we can write η(dt, dm) = L(dt) × η t (dm) where the mapping [0, T ] ∋ t → η t (·) ∈ P(P(A)) is a measurable mapping and the decomposition is unique up to almost everywhere equality. On the other hand, for any measurable function ν : [0, T ] → P(A), we may construct an element Ψ(ν) in R 0 by:
Since we have changed the way we represent the mean field of control, we need to modify accordingly the definition of transition rate matrix as well as the cost functionals in order to make them compatible with the randomization procedure. For any function F : P(A) → R possibly containing other arguments, we denote F : P(P(A)) → R by F (m) := ν∈P(A) F (ν)m(dν), which we call the randomized version of F . Obviously we have F (δ ν ) = F (ν). In this way, we define without any ambiguity the randomized version q of the rate function q, as well as its matrix representation Q. We also define f as the randomized version of cost functional f . Since the terminal cost g does not depend on the mean field of control, we do not need to consider its randomized version.
Recall from Assumption 3.4 that the minimizerâ i of the reduced Hamiltonian is only a function of t, z and p. Consequently, for H, H i ,Ĥ andĤ i , which are the randomized version of H, H i ,Ĥ andĤ i respectively, we still
In addition, we have the following result on the Lipschitz property ofĤ andâ:
Lemma 4.8. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × (0, T ], p, p ′ ∈ S, α, α ′ ∈ A, z, z ′ ∈ R m and m, m ′ ∈ P(P(A)), we have:
and
Proof. We have:
Since the space P(A) is compact and the mapping ν →Ĥ(t, X t− , z, p, ν) is Lipschitz, with Lipschitz constant equal to C(1 + z Xt− ), Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality theory implies:
is the Wasserstein-1 distance on the space of probability measure on P(A) whose definition we recall for the sake of definiteness:
Combined with the estimation above, we obtain the desired inequality forĤ. The Lipschitz property for q can be proved in the same way.
Mapping fixed points.
We now define the mapping whose fixed points characterize the Nash equilibria of the mean field game in its weak formulation. For any (µ, η) ∈ P × R 0 , where η has the disintegration η(dt, dm) = L(dt) × η t (dm), we consider the solution (Y (µ,η) , Z (µ,η) ) to the BSDE:
Denote byα (µ,η) the predictable process t →â(t, X t− , Z (µ,η) t , π(t, µ)), which is the optimal control of the player faced with the mean field (µ, η) ∈ P(E) × R 0 . Next, we consider the scalar martingale L (µ,η) defined by:
Define the probability measureQ (µ,η) by:
where E(L (µ,η) ) is the Doléans-Dade exponential of the martingale L (µ,η) . Finally we define the mappings Φ µ , Φ η and Φ respectively by:
Remark 4.9. Before delving into its properties of Φ, we first need to show that the mapping Φ is well-defined. More specifically, we need to show that given (µ, η) ∈ P × R 0 , the outputsQ Proof. It suffices to show that for all (µ, η) ∈ P × R 0 , we have Φ µ (µ, η) ∈ P 0 . By the definition of P 0 in (35), this boils down to showing that there exists a constant C 0 > 0 such that for all (µ, η), we have:
Let us denote W t := E(L (µ,η) ) t . By Itô's lemma we have:
We know that the optional quadratic variation of M can be decomposed as:
where G is a martingale. Therefore we have:
Let T n be a sequence of stopping time converging to +∞ which localizes both the local martingales
Then integrating the above SDE between 0 and T ∧ T n and taking the expectation under P we obtain:
Here we have used Tonelli's theorem as well as the fact that I * s · ψ s · I s is bounded by a constant C 0 independent of µ, η and n, which is a consequence of the boundedness of the transition rate function q. Now applying Gronwall's lemma we obtain:
T ∧Tn ] ≤ C 0 . where the constant C 0 does not depend on n, µ or η. Notice that W 2 T ∧Tn converges to W 2 t almost surely, we apply Fatou's lemma and obtain
4.3.
Existence of Nash equilibria. The last missing piece in applying Schauder's fixed point theorem is to show the continuity of the mapping Φ on P × R 0 for the product topology. To this end, we show the continuity of the mappings Φ µ and Φ η . Notice that both P and R 0 are metrizable, so we only need to show sequential continuity. Let us fix a sequence (
and Q (n) for n ≥ 0. We also denote by E (n) the expectation under Q (n) and p (n) t = π(t, µ (n) ), whereas E still denotes the expectation under the reference measure P. We start by proving the continuity of Φ µ , or equivalently the convergence of Q (n) toward Q (0) . We divide the proof into several intermediary results.
Lemma 4.11. Without any loss of generality, we may assume that there exists a constant C such that
Proof. We consider the following ODE of unknown
. By Lemma 4.8, we see that t → ζ(t, v) is measurable for all v ∈ R m and v → ζ(t, v) is Lipschitz in v uniformly in t. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in [11] , the ODE (47) admits a unique solution on the interval [0, T ], which is absolutely continuous. Now we define Y t = m i=1 ½(X t = e i )V i (t) and Z t = V t . By continuity of V , we have
Applying Ito's formula to Y, we obtain:
where in the last equality we used the fact that dX s = Q 0 · X s− ds + dM s and V t = Z t . Therefore (Y, Z) and (Y (0) , Z (0) ) solves the same BSDE. As we have discussed in Remark 4.9, we may assume that Z (0) = Z. Therefore
Xt− is bounded for all ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ] by a uniform constant. Now we show that Z (n) converges toward Z (0) . Proposition 4.12. We have:
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, it suffices to check that:
converges to 0 for all t ≤ T , and that I n (t) is bounded by C uniformly in t and n. We also need to check
converges to 0. By Lipschitz property of the cost functional g and Lemma 4.3, we have:
as n → +∞. To check the uniform boundedness of I n (t), we recall from Lemma 3.7 that:
whereW 1 is the Wasserstein distance on the space P(P(A)). Clearly p
can be bounded by a constant since p (n) t is in the simplex S. On the other hand, we have:
2 is bounded, which implies thatW 1 (η
t ) is also bounded by a constant uniformly in n and t. This implies:
which means that I n (t) is uniformly bounded in n and t. To show that I n (t) converges to 0, we write:
By Lemma 4.3, we have (1 + Z
On the other hand, we have:
where the right hand side is ds ⊗ dP-integrable. Therefore by the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain:
as n → +∞. It remains to show that:
converges to 0. For a fix w ∈ Ω and s ≤ T , we have:
where we defined κ(s, ν) :
s , ν). Clearly κ is continuous in ν for all s. On the other hand, by inequality (26) in Lemma 3.7, for all t ≤ s ≤ T and ν ∈ P(A) we have:
Therefore by Lemma 4.11 and the boundedness of P(A), we conclude that the mapping (s, ν) → κ(s, ν) is bounded. It follows from the definition of stable topology and η (n) → η (0) that:
for all w ∈ Ω. In addition, we have:
2 ds is integrable. Apply once again the dominated convergence theorem, we conclude that K n converges to 0. This completes the proof.
We will also need a result on a more convenient representation of the Doléans-Dade exponential of L (n) .
Lemma 4.13. Denote by W (n) the Doléans-Dade exponential of L (n) . Then the Itô differential of log(W (n) ) satisfies:
t . Applying Ito's formula and noticing that the continuous martingale part of L n is zero, we have:
Then using dL
t · dM t and noticing that the jumps of L n are driven by the jumps of M, and hence X, we obtain:
t ), where we have used the fact that for all q-matrices A, we have X *
Piggybacking on the derivation following equation (6) , for X t− = e i and X t = e j we have:
Using matrix notation and recalling the definition of O in the statement of Lemma 4.13, we may write:
Using again the equality ∆X t = dX t = Q 0 · X t− dt + dM t , we arrive at the desired representation of the differential of log(W t ).
We now show the first component of the mapping Φ is sequentially continuous.
Proof. For two probability measures Q and Q ′ in P, the total variation distance d between Q and Q ′ is:
It is well-known that convergence in total variation implies weak convergence, hence convergence in the topological space P. Therefore our aim is to show that d T V (Q (n) , Q (0) ) → 0 as n → +∞. By Pinsker's inequality, we have:
Using Lemma 4.13, we have:
By Assumption 2.2, the process t → t 0
s )) · dM s is a true martingale therefore have zero expectation. We now deal with the convergence of the term
can be dealt with in the exact the same way. Using the Lipschitz property ofâ and Q in Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 4.8, we obtain:
Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Uniqueness of Nash equilibria will be proven under the following conditions. Assumption 5.1. (i) The transition rate function q does depend neither on the mean field of state p nor on the mean field of control ν. The cost functional f is separable in the sense that it is of the form:
(ii) For all t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, z ∈ R m , p ∈ S and ν ∈ P(A), the mapping α → H i (t, z, α, p, ν) admits a unique minimizer, whichbecause of assumption (i), only depends on t and z. We denote it byâ i (t, z). In addition, we assume thatâ i is a measurable from [0, T ] × R m into A, and that there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and z, z ′ ∈ R m :
t .
Taking expectations with respect to Q (1) and Q (2) and using the fact that
0 ], we obtain the following equality:
Next we notice that:
t , ν
k for all i = 1, 2 and k = 1, . . . , m. Now using item (iii) of Assumption 5.1, we have:
T ))([p
t ))([p
Assume that there exists a measurable subset N of [0, T ] × Ω with strictly positve dt ⊗ dQ (1) measure, such that
on N . By Assumption 5.1, the mapping α → H(t, X t− , α, Z
t , p
t ) admits a unique minimizer and therefore for all (t, w) ∈ N , we have:
Piggybacking on the argument laid out above, we see that the first inequality is strict in (56) which leads to a contradiction. Therefore we haveα
1 -a.e., and dt⊗ dP-a.e., since P is equivalent to Q (1) . It follows that α
t , dt ⊗ dP-a.e. Finally, using the same type of argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.14, we obtain Q (1) = Q (2) which finally leads to (p (1) , ν (1) ) = (p (2) , ν (2) ). This completes the proof of the uniqueness.
Approximate Nash Equilibrium for Games with Finite Many Players
In this section we show that the solution of a mean field game can be used to construct approximate Nash equilibria for games with finitely many players. We first set the stage for the weak formulation of the game with N players in finite state spaces. Recall that Ω is the space of càdlág mappings from [0, T ] to E = {e 1 , . . . , e M } which are continuous on T , t → X t is the canonical process and F := (F t ) t≤T is the natural filtration generated by X. Let us fix p
• ∈ S a probability distribution on the state space E. Let P be the probability on (Ω, F T ) under which X is a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rate matrix Q 0 and initial distribution p • . Let Ω N be the product space of N copies of Ω, and P N be the product probability measure of N identical copies of P. For n = 1, . . . , N , define the process X n t (w) := w n t of which the natural filtration is denoted by 
Throughout this section, we let Assumptions 2.2, 2.7 and 3.4 hold. In addition, we adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 6.1. The transition rate function q does not depend on the mean field of state, nor the mean field of control.
We assume that each player can observe the entire past history of every player's state. We denote by A N the collection of F N -predictable processes taking values in A. Each player n chooses a strategy α n ∈ A N . We define the martingale L
and the probability measure Q (α 1 ,...,α N ) by: as well as the empirical distribution of the controls:
where δ a (·) is the Dirac measure on a. The total expected cost of player n in the game with N players, denoted by J n,N (α 1 , . . . , α N ), is defined as:
Now let us consider a Nash equilibrium (α * , p * , ν * ) of the mean field game in the sense of Definition 2.8. Recall that balpha * is a predictable process with respect to the natural filtration generated by the canonical process X. For each n = 1, . . . , N , we may define the controlα n of player n by:
Clearly,α n is F n,N -predictable. In other words, it only depends on the observation of player n's own path. Therefore the strategy profileα (N ) := (α 1 , . . . ,α N ) is a distributed strategy profile, which means that every player's strategy is only based on the observation of its own path.
In the following, we will show thatα (N ) is an approximate Nash equilibrium in a sense to be made clear later on. To this end, we first give a result on the propagation of chaos, which compare players n's total expected cost in the mean field game versus its total expected cost in the finite player game. To simplify the notations, we use the abbreviation (β,α for Eα (N ) . We start from the following lemmas:
Lemma 6.2. There exists a sequence (δ N ) N ≥0 such that δ N → 0 as N → +∞, and such that for all N ≥ 1, n ≤ N and t ≤ T we have:
Proof. SinceQ (N ) = Qα (N ) and the fact that (α * , p * , ν * ) is an equilibrium of the mean field game, we deduce that under the measureQ (N ) , the states X 
On the other hand, ν(β t ,α −1,N t ) and ν * t are in P(A) with A being a compact subset of R d . We have:
where C is a constant only depending on sup a∈A a which changes its value from line to line. Now applying Theorem 1 in [12] , we have:
Combining with the estimates previously shown, we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 6.3. There exists a constant C which only depends on the bound of the transition rate q, such that for all N > 0 and β ∈ A we have:
Proof. Let us denote
. By Ito's formula we have:
Recall that:
and dM
Noticing that for n = 1, the jumps of M n t do not result in the jumps of W t , we obtain:
Piggybacking on the computation in equation (6), we see that when X 1 t− = e i = e j = X t , we have ∆M 
.
Let us define Ξ β t to be an m by m matrix where the diagonal elements are 0 and the element on the i-th row and the j-th column is q(t,i,j,βt)−q(t,i,j,α . Then it is clear that ∆W t = e * i · Ξ β t · (e j − e i ). It follows that:
Injecting the above equation into the Itô decomposition of W t , we obtain:
In the second equality, we use the fact that under the measureQ (N ) , the state process X 1 t has the canonical decomposition dX
We also use the equality ∆M
t . In addition, by replacing X 1 t with e i for i = 1, . . . , M , it is plain to check the following equality:
. This leads to the following representation of W t :
where δ N is as appeared in Lemma 6.2, and C is a constant only depending on T , the Lipschitz constant of f and g and the constant appearing in Lemma 6.3. this gives us the desired inequality.
As a direct consequence of the above result on the propagation of chaos, we show that the Nash equilibrium of the mean field game consists of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the game with finite many players.
Theorem 6.5. There exists a sequence ǫ N converging to 0 such that for all N > 0, β ∈ A and n ≤ N , we have:
Proof. Recall that the strategy profile isα (N ) = (α 1 , . . . ,α N ) is defined as:
where α * is the strategy of the mean field game equilibrium, together with p * as the mean field of states and ν * as the mean field of control. For a strategy profile (α 1 , . . . , α N ) we use the notation:
is the solution (at time t = 0) of the following BSDE:
By the optimality of the equilibrium, we know that for all t ∈ [0, T ],α 1 t minimizes the mapping α → H(t, X
. Clearly, the solution of the above BSDE (66) is also the unique solution to the following BSDE: (67)
with Z n t = 0 for n = 2, . . . , N . Indeed, the existence and uniqueness of the BSDE (67) can be checked easily by applying Theorem 6.7. On the other hand, by following exactly the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.8, we can show that
is the solution (at time t = 0) of: (68)
Notice that H(s, X
. Applying the comparison principle as stated in Theorem 6.8 to the BSDEs (67) and (68), we conclude that
) for all β ∈ A. Now thanks to symmetry, we have
) for all β ∈ A and n = 1, . . . , N . The desired results immediately follows by applying Proposition 6.4.
Appendix: BSDEs Driven by Multiple Independent Continuous-Time Markov Chains
Let us consider a probability space (Ω, F , P) supporting N independent continuous-time Markov chains X 1 , . . . , X N . For each n = 1, . . . , N , we assume that X n takes only m n states, which are represented by the basis vectors of the space R mn . We assume that under P, the transition rate matrix of X n is Q 0,n , which is an m n × m n matrix where all the diagonal elements equal −(m n − 1) and all the off-diagonal elements equal 1. We denote by F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by (X 1 , . . . , X N ). It is clear that for each n, we can decompose the Markov chain X n as X n t = X n 0 + t 0 Q 0,n · X n s− ds + dM n t , where M n is an F-martingale. In addition, due to the independence of the Markov chains, for all n 1 = n 2 and t ≤ T , P-almost surely we have ∆X Let us consider the processX defined byX t := X In addition it has the canonical decomposition:
whereM is a F-martingale which satisfies:
(71) dM t = Plugging the above equalities into the Itô decomposition yields the desired result for N = 2. The case N > 2 can be treated by applying a simple argument of induction, which we will not detail here.
As in the case of a single Markov chain, we define the stochastic matrix ψ Here ξ is a F T -measurable P-square integrable random variable and the driver F : Ω×[0, T ]×R×R m1 ×· · ·×R mN → R is a function such that the process t → F (w, t, y, z 1 , . . . , z N ) is predictable for all y, z 1 , . . . , z N ∈ R × R m1 × · · · × R mN . The unknowns of the equation are a càdlàg process Y taking values in R and predictable processes Z 1 , . . . , Z N taking valus in R m1 , . . . , R mN respectively.
Theorem 6.7. Assume that there exists a constant C > 0 such that dt × P-a.s., we have: t , where we have used the fact that for any two vectors X 1 , X 2 we have diag(X 1 ⊗ X 2 ) = diag(X 1 ) ⊗ diag(X 2 ). This immediately leads to the equality (74). Now we consider the BSDE driven by the continuous-time Markov chaiñ X with terminal condition ξ and the driver functionF defined by: By equality (74) and the assumption on the regularity of F , we have:
Applying Lemma 3.1 we obtain the existence of the solution to the BSDE: This shows that (Y, Z 1 , Z 2 ) is a solution to BSDE (72).
We also state a comparison principle for linear BSDEs driven by multiple independent Markov chains.
Theorem 6.8. For each n ∈ {1, . . . , N }, let γ n be a bounded predictable process in R mn such that Assume that for all n = 1, . . . , N , t ∈ (0, T ] and j such that (e + is the Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix ψ n t . Then Y is nonnegative. Proof. As before we treat the case for N = 2, for which the argument can be trivially generalized to any N > 2. Since γ n and β are bounded processes and * ⊗ I m2 ) · Z s ) solves the BSDE (18), which is also its unique solution. Therefore we only need to show that the solution Y to BSDE (18) is nonnegative. To this ends, we need to apply the comparison principal for the case of a single Markov chain, as is stated in Lemma 3.3. Note that X 1 and X 2 do not jump simultaneously and X t = X 
